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Did Over-Regulation of The Connecticut Company Quicken the Demise of 
Hartford’s Trolley System? 
 
Preface 
   Hartford’s electric trolley system formed the center of New England’s most extensive 
rail network on the early 20th century1. While this system2 only lasted from 1888 until 
1941, it was enormously influential in daily lives of nearly all of Hartford’s citizens and 
the economic system of the early 20th century. The demise of these electric street railways 
is the subject of much scholarship focusing on either the nostalgia aspects of the bygone 
trolleys or the alleged involving General Motors, Standard Oil and Firestone Tire and 
Rubber. This cartel supposedly bought up and shut down numerous trolley systems in 
order to eliminate the trolleys from competing with the motor vehicles (buses) and then to 
later entice consumers into the purchase of automobiles.  Since the 1990s, efforts have 
been made to revive fixed route transportation in the form of light rail and busway 
projects.  Such projects have become the subject of intense public debate over their 
necessity as part of economic growth of the region and sources of taxation required for 
these endeavors. 
   The irony of this debate is that Hartford once enjoyed a trolley system far more 
extensive than any transit project proposed today.  While the debate today generally 
focuses on the funding of mass transit projects, it is important to note that the transit 
                                                                 
1 Hinton and Due, 319  
2 For the purposes of this paper, the term “Hartford system” is used generically to refer to the complex and 
interlocking relationships of the street traction companies.  The Hartford Street Railway, founded in 1896 
was united with dozens of other traction companies through a complex series of buyouts, leases and 
mergers.  This eventually culminated in The Connecticut Company, the predecessor to the modern 
CTTransit.   
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systems of yesteryear were funded largely with private bond issues and at little cost to the 
taxpayer.     
    Since most Connecticut trolleys ran on public streets, trolley companies were forced to 
negotiate franchise agreements with the cities in exchange for the right to of easement.  
Municipal control of the trolley systems varied in severity from state to state.  Typically, 
trolley companies signed an agreement gaining the right to operate on streets for a period 
of twenty-five years. The trolley companies were required to lay and maintain its tracks 
and fares were fixed at a rate of five cents for the duration of the franchise period.  The 
level of municipal control over the Hartford system was supreme.  The city retained the 
ability to dictate routes, regulate fares and set requirements for times and frequency of 
service.  In some instances, The Connecticut Company was forbidden to discontinue 
routes even when these routes proved to be unprofitable with low ridership.   
   Traction companies were able to accept the weight of regulations as a cost of doing 
business until the federal government increased the level of transit regulation in the 
1910s.  During WWI, the National War Labor Board deemed electric trolleys critical to 
the war effort.  Aspects of trolley operation such as operator wages were brought under 
regulation and fixed to national prevailing levels.  While wage outlays doubled from 
1915 to 1920, traction companies were prohibited from increasing fares accordingly3. 
Trolley systems also degenerated under federal controls in that they were prevented from 
making the necessary equipment upgrades required to remain operational.  
   After the 1920s, the government returned Hartford’s trolleys from national to local 
control, however public utility regulations fomented a new threat to the trolley operators.  
Hartford’s trolley system, like many others, had ties to the local power utilities.  The level 
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of integration of the Hartford trolley system with the utility was absolute as the two 
entities were organized under the Connecticut Railway and Light Company4.  Although 
initially immune from public utility and interstate commerce regulations, the trolley 
systems were eventually forced to disassociate themselves from the power generation 
companies due to holding-company regulations in the 1930s5.  This resulted in the loss of 
a number of operational efficiencies in the maintenance of the distribution systems, 
placing additional financial burdens on the already struggling trolley system.    
   Since The Connecticut Company in many ways served as a model for other systems 
and operated for roughly the same period, it is fairly representative of the national trends 
in trolley regulation. The author does not dispute the conclusion of other scholars that the 
final blow to trolleys was struck in the 1940s when the remaining street railways were 
replaced with buses.  This study however finds previous scholarship lacking in failing to 
stress that federal and municipal government regulation had so mortally wounded the 
trolley systems by the 1920s that their demise was inevitable.  While previous scholarship 
has focused on the effects of the buses and automobile on trolley operations, this study 
shall present evidence suggesting that government interference had an equal role in the 
demise of the trolley systems.  
   Unlike the demise of trolleys in other cities caused due to buyouts (possible by the GM 
cartel) and subsequent replacement with buses, the Hartford system was not bought out 
and the author found no evidence of GM’s involvement.  The transformation from 
trolleys to buses in The Connecticut Company took place under auspices of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Pattacini, 9 
4 Stanford, 4 
5 Hinton and Due, 230 
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company’s management in a piecemeal fashion starting in the 1920s as various routes 
became more economical to operate with buses.   
 Specifically, this study shall present evidence to suggest that the franchise agreements 
under which the trolley companies operated were grossly unfair and put traction 
companies at a significant disadvantage compared to bus and jitney providers.   This 
disadvantage was mainly in the form of unequal taxation, technical and work practice 
regulations.   
 
The Beginnings of Hartford Municipal Trolley Regulation 
   Hartford’s initial horse trolley lines faced little resistance in their initial establishment 
of routes from Hartford to Wethersfield.  Trolleys were seen as a sign of progress and 
prestige for the growing Victorian city.  Eventually more lines were added and in 1888, 
the first Hartford line was electrified.  Many were skeptical about the use of 
electrification and some residents vociferously lobbied the city to not allow the current 
carrying overhead troller wires to be installed above the city streets.  For the privilege of 
operating trolleys on city streets, the city council exacted a fee of two percent of the 
trolley revenues6.  Trolley operators were required to sign franchise agreements with the 
city government requiring that fares would remain fixed for a period of typically twenty-
five years.  Fares on most lines were five cents or less.  
   City regulations required that the trolley company coordinate with the city government 
and city engineering department on every aspect of trolley operations.   In the 1890s 
when most of the city’s lines were electrified, the city initially attempted to force the 
trolley operators to install underground slotted power system instead of the overhead 
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lines.  Given that most streets of the day were dirt or macadam this alternative would 
have been cost prohibitive and technically unfeasible.  Finally, after delays the city 
relented and allowed the overhead wires.  In 1909 when the Main St. and Central Row 
tracks were changed from single to double tracks to increase capacity, the city’s engineer 
Jack Ross, prescribed the design details and coordinated all track- laying efforts through 
the city’s approved contractor, Balf Company7.   
   Another particularly troublesome regulation that caused grave financial hardship to the 
trolley systems was the city’s regulation requiring traction companies to pave the streets 
between the rails and for a set distance outside the rails.  Before the turn of the century, 
when streets were macadam or dirt, this regulation was reasonable since the repeated 
wear of the horse hooves damaged the streets.  By the early 1920s, however this 
regulation was obsolete because many of the major thoroughfares were paved with 
asphalt and the electrified trolley lines provided no further hoof-damage to the streets. 
   The organized efforts at snow removal from the main streets were a municipal 
requirement directed at the traction companies.  Traction companies were forced to plow 
the streets where its lines ran.  This service benefited not only the trolley lines, but the 
operators of automobiles as well.  Due to the weather and frequency clauses in franchise 
agreements, trolley operations were required in inclement weather even in times of low 
ridership.  Jitney and bus companies faced no such restrictions.   
    Hartford did not limit the scope of public regulation to technical issues alone.  Moral 
issues were pervasive in the legislation of trolley politics.  Initially, traction companies 
were unable to run on the Sabbath.  This resulted in the losses of unspecified amounts of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 Hartford Scrap Book Vol. 17, P. 45, The Hartford Collection 
7 Hartford Scrap Book Vol 18, P. 9, The Hartford Collection 
 6 
revenues for the companies.  This Victorian-age restriction was apparently taken very 
seriously and once resulted in the arrest of a Hartford lineman Orrin W. Chaffer, 
performing wire repairs in East Hartford on a Sunday8.  The case was appealed to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court where it was later dropped.   
   Finally, moral and religious arguments were employed to allow the trolleys to gain 
limited rights to Sunday operations.  Mrs. Crilly, the wife of a traction company 
employee petitioned the city council for the right to have special event service to 
transport the faithful to religious revival meetings held by Reverend Moody in the 
Meadows area.  Other church groups followed suite petitioned the city council for 
Sunday trolley service and the council relented.  This did not mark the end of 
paternalistic legislation.  When ladies’ fashions came to favor the sheath-skirt, the 
traction company was order to lower the running boards so women did not have to breach 
their modesty when boarding the trolley.  This design change came at a price of $75,0009.   
   Other technical regulations of the Hartford trolleys involved the city’s use of police 
influence to compel The Connecticut Company to install additional seating in the 
trolleys 10.  Hartford trolleys, like most others, utilized hanging straps for the passengers 
to hold into as they rode standing up.  This allowed more passengers to fit into a trolley 
during rush hour times.  The riding public reacted to this and demanded additional seats 
be installed, thus decreasing the number of passengers the trolley could carry.  Lucius S. 
Storrs, then-president of The Connecticut Company was also nationally known in his role 
as a spokesman for the electric street railway industry.  The Wilcox Report prepared for 
the Federal Electric Railways Commission provides details of Storrs’ testimony before 
                                                                 
8 Hartford Scrap Book Vol. 18, P. 9, The Hartford Collection  
9 Hartford Scrap Book Vol. 18. p 16, The Hartford Collection 
 7 
the commission11.  Storrs describes the use of political influence and pressure to induce 
the Connecticut Company into extending trolley lines to the small community of 
Westport.  The community has too small a population to support ridership for the line 
extension; however, the town selectmen had interests in land and were thus able to induce 
the trolley to extend a line.   According to Storrs’ testimony, the trolley took in only 
$2000, but cost $8000 to operate12.   
   The relationship between the management and Hartford’s business elite was highly 
integrated.  While this paper does not attempt to exhaustively investigate the political ties 
of all the principals, it is very interesting to note that the principals of the Hartford Street 
Railway Company included the president of The Travelers Insurance Company, the 
president of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, and a state senator13.  
Additionally the vice president had familial ties to the founder of the Hartford Electric 
Company.  Such an arrangement almost exactly parallels the fictional arrangement of the 
street railway system described by Theodore Dreiser in his work, The Financier14.  The 
book, written in 1912, attempted to expose the rampant corruption in the municipal 
governments during the period.  Specifically targeted in the book is the illegitimate 
manipulation of bond issues in attempt to form street railway combinations.   
Federal Regulation of Hartford’s Trolleys 
   Probably single most devastating government regulation faced by the traction 
companies was the nationalization of transit regulation in WWI.  The federal government, 
deeming the trolleys integral to the war effort brought the trolley systems under its reign 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 Wilcox, 88 
11 Wilcox, 90 
12 Wilcox, 90 
13 Pattacini, 8 
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in 1915.  Wages paid to the motormen increased because of the federal mandate.  
Traction companies, already overcapitalized, compensated by deferring upgrades and 
reducing maintenance.  One way the Hartford system finessed a way around the 
regulations was through the development of the zone fare system.  It was technically not 
possible to raise the fare past five cents, however the city did allow the increasing fares 
for passengers traveling through more that a single zone area.  Interestingly, The 
Connecticut Company was the first system to implement a zone fare system.  
   The WWI difficulties were increasingly compounded by difficulties in obtaining metal, 
particularly the copper that was integral to electrical wiring systems.  During the war the 
federal government rationed critical materials for the war effort.  Many of the trolley 
lines still operated with equipment installed at the initial electrification of 1896.  The 
inability to perform equipment upgrades put the trolley lines on an unequal footing with 
the newer jitney and bus competition.    The unequal treatment of trolleys and bus lines 
extended to the federal tax realm.   Nearly all traction companies, including Hartford’s 
were organized as corporations.  At the beginning of the 20th century, the federal 
government obtained its revenues from tariffs and corporate taxes.  The war effort put 
additional revenue strains on corporations in the form of federal taxation.  The physical 
plant and rolling stock of the traction companies were considered assets and federal tax 
law dictated the rules used for depreciation.  Jitney companies were often sole proprietors 
on small time operators.  Personal motor vehicles were not taxed at the federal level, nor 
did these small time operators have to pay corporate taxes on their operational profits. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Dreiser, 1-450 (This book was a fictionalization of the life of transport magnate Charles T. Jerkes) 
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   Mr. Loring, a contemporary of Lucius Storrs, testified on behalf of the Lynn, 
Massachusetts traction company, describing the tax avoidance of the jitney bus 
competitors. 
 
“For instance, we showed the City of Lynn the other day that we paid in taxes $30,000 
and we ran about 40 regular cars; that is $750 per car, figured in that way.  The jitney bus 
seats 20 or 30 and it pays an average of $25.”15   
   
   In later years, the federal and state governments directly subsidized the automobile 
industry via road construction, providing a further impetus for the use of automobiles.  
Traction companies had to cover the cost of laying tracks and maintaining their systems, 
while buses and jitneys used the public thoroughfares for free.  In the early years, there 
were little in the way of technical regulations relating to buses, allowing them to operate 
cheaply.  Trolley companies were also forced to pay maintenance fees on various other 
roads and bridges16, all items from which the buses and jitneys derived benefit.   
   Traction companies were initially immune from the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
due to the fact that they did not engage in interstate trade.  This changed when a trolley 
lines was constructed between the District of Columbia and Maryland.   Through a series 
of court decisions, the practices of the traction companies came under increasing 
regulation.  Hartford’s system operated a line between Hartford and Springfield, 
Massachusetts, thus crossing state boundaries.  Other lines transcended state lines of 
Rhode Island and New York.  While the most damaging regulations had primarily to do 
                                                                 
15 Wilcox, 104 
16 “To Begin Hearings on Trolley Bills”, The Hartford Courant , p. 3, 4/8/1919 
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with labor practices, the regulations of freight interchange also caused the electric 
railroads considerable difficulty.  Franchise agreements specifically restricted the 
transportation of freight on street railways.  Most street railways were not initially 
constructed for the purpose of freight traffic, yet in many parts of the country, traction 
companies found it more profitable to haul freight than passengers.  Some passenger 
operations were even subsidized by the freight operations.  These regulations existed 
because municipal governments were afraid that street railway tracks would eventually 
allow steam locomotives onto the city streets.  Electric traction companies rarely, if ever, 
shared the same tracks as steam rail systems, yet freight interchange was one avenue of 
possible profit for the trolley and interurban rail systems.  Freight operations had been 
strictly regulated at the federal level since the 188717 and those wishing to engage in rail 
freight operations were required to join into joint pricing agreements and obtain federal 
approval for their routes.  Interchange of freight would have allowed freight to be shipped 
via rail to many of the smaller localities not served by steam railroads.  Additionally, 
freight interchange would have created a more integrated transportation network, with 
speed of transit being increased.  Such speed increases were not only more convenient for 
passengers, but absolutely essential for those shipping perishable agricultural products in 
an age with limited refrigeration.  Steam railroads, which enjoyed a more powerful lobby 
that the electric traction companies feared that traction companies would take away their 
business by delivering a similar service at a lower cost.  While there are some instances 
of overlap between the two services, it was generally uneconomical for either an electric 
                                                                 
17 Hinton and Due, 152.  As Hinton and Due point out, the ICC gas given authority over railroads, but the 
Intrastate Commerce Act did not adequately define what a “railroad” was.  This later led to the imposition 
of rules on electric railroads that were probably intended for the larger steam roads.   
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traction company or a steam road to build a duplicate route.  Trolley freight operated on a 
limited basis in Hartford as late as 192018 servicing Pratt and Whitney.   
   The Hartford trolley system eventually did become integrated with the New York and 
New Haven and Hartford Rail Road.   This was due to a period of consolidations 
bolstered by the fact that some of the New Haven heavy freight lines were already 
electrified.  Eventually, however, all trolley operations in the state became part of 
Connecticut Railway and Light Company (predecessor of CL&P) and later the 
Connecticut Company when power utility operations were divorced from street railways.  
It is of particular importance to note that the disassociation of the power companies 
presented a number of technical problems to the street railways.  Trolley powerhouses 
produced a large amount of power, yet maximum current draw occurred when numerous 
electrical motors in the trolleys were starting at the same time.  This meant that the trolley 
powerhouses produced an excess of electricity that could potentially be sold as a utility 
commodity if converted to AC.  From a service and maintenance standpoint it made 
sense for the electrical company to use a single service department to maintain both 
systems.   
   As has been pointed out, technical regulations imposed on the trolley systems presented 
a hurdle to the Hartford system as the electric traction industry was in the early days of 
standardization and consolidation.  As the years progressed, the technical issues did not 
pose as great a hurdle as the bond finance regulations imposed at the federal level.  One 
of the most common practices in trolley finance was the watering down of bond issues 
used to fund the construction of new lines.  This practice is equivalent to running the 
printing presses to mint new money.  Throughout history this has only lead to the 
                                                                 
18 “Trolley Freight may be stopped in Hartford”.  The Hartford Courant, p. 2, 6/9/1920 
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devaluation of monetary instruments and has made investors leery of devoting further 
capital to the losing proposition.  
 
Labor issues in Hartford Trolley History 
   Hartford’s street railways were a hotbed of union activity.  Newspaper headlines from 
the 1910s to the 1920s19 indicate agitation on the part of the unions for increased wages 
and standardized working conditions. Union activity started primarily after the street 
railways were electrified and followed national trends in the unionization of rail systems.  
Trolley employees threatened strikes in 1913, 1918, and 191920.  Fortunately most of 
these disputes were solved at the bargaining table.  Traction operations remained a blue-
collar profession, though it was one of the most respected21 of the AFL trades.  The 
effectivity of the trolley system depended on the reach of its lines.  By the 1920s the 
trolley companies had extended service to smaller towns such as Willimantic and Bristol 
in order to increase ridership.  To fund these expansions, bond issues were made, 
typically on the Philadelphia exchange 22.  Watering of bond issues placed the traction 
company in a precarious position, especially considering the increasing wage demands of 
the workers.  The archives of The Hartford Courant indicate numerous protests by the 
public ridership demanding reductions in fares or opposing fare increases23.   
As new lines were installed, city governments held fast their demands of the fixed fare.  
As late as 1917, the fare on the Manchester line was only six cents, not much more than 
                                                                 
19 Hartford Courant Archives, index note cards for The Connecticut Company 
20 Hartford Courant Archives, index note cards for The Connecticut Company 
21 Middleton, 362 
22 The Philadelphia exchange was used because the New York investors were heavily vested in the steam 
road stocks.  Steam Railroad companies saw electric railways as a threat and thus made offerings on the 
New York exchange a conflict of interest for many brokerage firms there.   
23 Hartford Courant Archives, index note cards for The Connecticut Company 
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fares were in the 1890s24.  In Hartford proper, the fare did not increase to six cents until 
191825.  Fare increases were not without protest.  The Hartford city hall fought the fare 
increases in court although the fare increases were eventually sustained.  Similar fare 
battles took place in Waterbury and Manchester. 
   Events of the early teens served as an admonition for the future of The Connecticut 
Company.  The fare protests by the public and the wage hikes caused by the federal 
government during the Great War brought the Connecticut Company to the brink of 
bankruptcy in February of 1919.  Throughout out early 1919 the debate roared on 
between The Connecticut Company and the municipal governments over trolley fares and 
the need to maintain service.  Even with the advent of the automobile, the vast majority 
of the families continued to use the trolleys to some degree into the 1920s.  No mayor 
could afford to appear too sympathetic to the desires of The Connecticut Company to 
raise fares, while at the same time many merchants called on the city governments to 
maintain constant trolley service so as not to interrupt the flow of customers.   
   The trolley companies did not have success in obtaining changes in the status quo until 
a government committee was established to investigate the trolley problems.  Senator 
John R. Dillon of Shelton chaired the committee and speakers included Lucius Storrs of 
The Connecticut Company and Harrison B. Freeman of the Hartford and Springfield 
[electric] Railway.  The committee favored a resolution to provide tax relief to the trolley 
companies and relieve them from their street paving obligations.  Mr. Freedman 
testified26 that it took the discontinuance of 127 miles of track in nearby Massachusetts to 
                                                                 
24 “Manchester Merchants Protest 6 Cent Fare”. The Hartford Courant, p. 3, 10/6/1917 
25 “Hartford Appeals Trolley Decision”, The Hartford Courant, p. 4/13/1918-this date is believed by the 
author to be correct, but uncertainty remains due to illegible copy.  
26 “Jitney Benefits Cause Criticism”, The Hartford Courant, p. 10, 4/16/1919.   
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get the public to “wake up” to the problems the trolleys faced and the unfairness of the 
untaxed and unregulated competition posed by the jitneys.    
   By May 1919, a plan was formulated allowing The Connecticut Company relief from 
some of its obligations relating to the maintenance of city streets.  Additionally, some of 
the taxes derived form trolley operations were reduced.  The plan did not appease the 
angry public as fare increases were continually contested.  During the latter months of 
1919, The Connecticut Company switched all of its operations over to the new system of 
zone fares, essentially allowing a fa re increase for riders traveling out of the core areas.  
The loudest protests came from outlying communities such as Stafford, where fares were 
hiked to 12 cents, nearly double what a rider had to pay for a cross-town fare.  Zone fares 
continued to cause protests into 1920 and were the resulted in a hearing at the Capitol in 
March of 1920.  The zone fare system was upheld, but it many say this as officially 
marking the beginning of the decline of electric trolleys.     
   The most contentious issue for the trolleymen apart from wages was the adoption of 
one-man cars by the Hartford system in 1920.  Prior to 1920, two trolleymen rode in each 
car; the motorman drove the car the conductor collected fares and issues transfers.  A new 
style of car designed at a conference of traction company presidents replaced most of the 
older wood cars with a larger all-metal construction car.  This new car employed an 
entrance door and automatic fare collection box near the driver’s seat.  A rear door was 
used to exit.  The trolley lines were still growing in 1920, however, this new car 
eliminated one of the well paid and respected positions from each car previously staffed 
by bargaining unit members.  Fighting over the right of The Connecticut Company to use 
the one-man cars dragged on until 1921.  The unions were mostly concerned with the 
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potential staffing reductions, but couched their arguments against the cars in terms on 
public safety.  Some felt that a reduction in safety would result if the role of the 
conductor were to be eliminated.  The fact that there had been a number of trolley 
mishaps involving fatalities did not favor the Connecticut Company.  The company 
eventually prevailed in the debate over the cars when the Public Utility Commission 
(PUC) ruled they were safe 27, but quickly became mired in another labor dispute in 1921.  
This dispute went to arbitration and a settlement was reached forcing The Connecticut 
Company to pay back wages to trolleymen.    
 
Hartford traction companies convert to buses  
   The 1920s proved to be a major turning point in the future of common carrier transit in 
Hartford.  Lucius Storrs blamed decreasing ridership on automobile usage and it was 
evident that the future of street running railways was limited.  Storrs was able to obtain 
tax relief for the trolleys, yet he was unsuccessful in his efforts to stymie the growth of 
jitney competition28.  The Connecticut Company met this impasse by obtaining 
authorization to convert a number of its lines to bus operations.  Government regulations 
continued to imperil The Connecticut Company as it converted to buses.  Each route 
required approval from the PUC with respect to the streets used, number of stops and 
frequency.   The PUC initially rejected The Connecticut Company’s application for bus 
service from Hartford to Manchester via Burnside Avenue 29. This was due to concerns 
relating to at-grade rail crossings by the proposed route.  This route was eventually 
established and ran along a similar path to the Z route of today, going from State House 
                                                                 
27 “One-man trolleys safer than others, Utility Commission rules”, p. 1, The Hartford Courant, 4/28/1922 
28 “Storrs asks Governor to lay Trolley Crisis before Extra Session”, p. 1, The Hartford Courant 9/1/1920 
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Square to the Buckland Hills Mall. It is the author’s experience that this route is fairly 
heavily traveled to this day.  By 1941 all trolley routes were converted to bus operations, 
relieving The Connecticut Company of its maintenance obligations.  The labor unrest 
however did not cease and the transit unions continued to agitate for strikes when their 
demands were not met.  In spite of the labor issues, the union did not protest the 
conversion to buses since there was not any loss in jobs to the bargaining unit.  Although 
no longer hindered by the burdensome franchise agreements, the federal laws relating to 
management and labor were strengthened in the 1930s forcing management to recognize 
the bargaining units of the labor unions.  The establishment of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) further limited market-based wage and labor practices and 
replacing them with socialistic government influenced practices.  Progress in the setup of 
the new bus facilities off Vernon St., won The Connecticut Company national industry 
recognition for excellence in operational efficiency30, but with labor making increasing 
demands these efficiencies did not translate into profits.  Primarily because of the war 
effort, the remaining unused trolley tracks were removed so the scrap metal could support 
the defense industries.  The New Haven operations of The Connecticut Company were 
the last to employ trolley service for the Yale bowl in 1948.  Soon after the complete 
removal of the New Haven trolley service, the municipal government of New Haven 
obtained court rulings allowing it to tax the assets of the bus service in the same manner 
as the previous trolley system had been taxed31.  Ramifications of this new tax meant that 
the Vernon St. garage facilities in Hartford were now taxable at the local level.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
29 “Conn. Co. Loses Route Application for Manchester”, The Hartford Courant 12/31/1939 
30 “Transit Workers Receive Coveted Efficiency Award”, The Hartford Courant, 1946 (exact date unclear 
due to partially missing header on clipping 
31 “Bus Company to Be Taxed in New Haven”, 9/13/49, The Hartford Courant  
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Additional tax revenues boosted municipal intake but reverted bus operations to a 
regulatory status much like that under the old trolley system. 
 
More Recent Trolley-like developments in Hartford 
   Labor and financial crises cont inued for The Connecticut Company.  It again fell upon 
hard times and was sold to a Hartford businessman in 1964, paving the way for an 
eventual takeover by the Connecticut Department of Transportation.   The Connecticut 
Company however was not the only organization to attempt to operate a fixed rail 
system.  In 1973 a four-month strike by bus drivers at Bradley airport crippled the 
transportation system surrounding the airport.  Using grant money from the state and 
federal governments, the airport solicited proposals for a fixed guideway tram system to 
move passengers to and from the car parking lot on a 0.7 mile guideway32.  Unlike the 
buses, this tramway was automated and did not rely on a driver, thus eliminating the 
threat of strikes from shutting the system down.  The project was completed in 1974 and 
operated until 1975, but was deemed an expensive failure by the then-new governor, Ella 
Grasso.  Operations ceased and the guide way was torn out in a subsequent airport 
renovation.  It is the author’s opinion that this system was overly ambitious for the early 
1970s and was probably too capital- intensive for the small line it served.  The author has 
observed a similar system in continuous operation at the Philadelphia International 
Airport, however automation and electrical technologies making this possible are more 
mature than they were in the 1970s.  Additionally, the Philadelphia airport is larger than 
Bradley and carries significantly more traffic.  
                                                                 
32 Static display at the Connecticut Trolley Museum 
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   Another failed government effort to revive a regiona l attempt at rail transport was the 
proposed Hartford Griffin Line of the early 1990s.  This proposal involved building a 
modern light rail line along an existing rail line to the Griffin Office Park north of 
Hartford.  Technically, this type of rail line could employ standard light rail equipment on 
an existing right of way.  This proposal however, would have depended on a $1.2M33 
yearly subsidy from the City of Hartford.  Without the support of the City Council and 
the Governor’s Office the proposal fell by the wayside. Previous scholars have derided 
the Department of Transportation for its opposition the Griffin Line proposal due the 
their, “Cheapness and lack of forward thinking.”34  Melissa Pattacini, the Trinity student 
who prepared this report, failed to consider the enormous impact to the taxpayer and did 
not identify any sources of funding for the project other than subsidies.  Pattacini did 
however correctly point out the predisposition of the Department of Transportation to 
projects favoring roads over other forms of transit35.  The issue of what form future 
transit will take is critical to the future of the region, since it is unlikely that Hartford can 
continue to widen roads and highways to fit in more cars and relieve congestion.   
   Another attempt to revive a fixed route system is the proposed Hartford-New Britain 
Busway project.  This project aims to use an abandoned rail right of way as a dedicated 
bus road between Hartford and New Britain, stopping at various points in between.  
Proponents of the project touted plans that included making the proposed stops 
resembling Victorian style buildings having space for coffee shops, dry cleaning services, 
                                                                 
33 Pattacini, 16 
34 Pattacini, 23 
35 Pattacini, 15 
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newsstands, and other conveniences to the rider36.  This proposal contained most of the 
benefits of a light rail system in that the transit vehicles traveled in an fixed route, 
separated by grade from other motor vehicle traffic giving it a speed advantage over 
street bus or freeway automobile use.  The use of buses instead of light rail makes costs 
far more manageable from the installation standpoint.  At the time of this writing, the 
busway has been selected as one of ten demonstration projects to receive funds from the 
Federal Transit Administration37.  A large hurdle in the planning and design of this 
project is the legal requirement to provide environmental impact studies.  Project 
planners must provide designs, which meet the federal guidelines and satisfy 
environmental concerns identified by the study.  The requirement of an environmental 
impact study amounts to another government hurdle since the proposed route is simply an 
alternative use of an existing right of way.  The impacts are, self evidently, of little 
change from the present usage.  The design will proceed through 2004 and actual 
implementation is scheduled for 2007.   
   Although unable to operate without massive subsidies, the busway projects will be a 
litmus test for future mass transit projects in the Hartford area.  Most consumers are 
unlikely to abandon their automobiles unless a mass transit system can shave time off the 
trip and eliminate the difficulties and cost associated with parking the city.    A busway 
by virtue of its separation from other forms of traffic enjoys this benefit, yet will still not 
be able to give the door-to-door service that automobile provides.   
   It is important to note that even without the governmental interference to private mass 
transit, bus and trolley systems would not have survived as they had been previously run.  
                                                                 
36 Notes by the author from, Hartford-Manchester/Vernon Bus Rapid Transit Study Public Information 
Meeting, attended by the Author 9/25/2001, Manchester City Hall, Manchester CT 
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In order to compete with the automobile it is necessary to have a dedicated right of way, 
avoiding the traffic jams of the freeway system and resulting in a benefit to the mass 
transit rider.  Mass transit will always have a ridership consisting of the poor and elderly, 
but the middle classes are unlikely to abandon their cars in Hartford until there is a 
substantial tangible benefit to using mass transit.    
 
Conclusions  
   Hartford once had a vibrant and far-reaching, trolley-based mass transit system that 
connected almost every neighborhood to the city center.  The hub of the system at the 
Old State House served to link Hartford with Springfield, and cities as far away as 
Boston, New York and Providence.  While this system was built largely with private 
funds, city bureaucrats regulated every aspect of the system.  Federal and state laws later 
put the trolley system at a disadvantage with respect to other transit modes due to the fact 
that the federal government subsidized road construction for the auto and additionally 
forced electric traction companies to comply with labor standards that no reasonable 
business would accept.   The cumulative effect of municipal, state and federal regulations 
was a factor in The Connecticut Company’s bankruptcy.  Without an equal playing field, 
the trolley systems were doomed. Conversion to buses and the advent of the automobile 
made mass transit less favorable and relegated it to the domain of the urban poor.     
   The strict regulatory environment is likely to deter investors from establishing future 
systems and any systems that are implemented will be established only through 
government largesse.  Unfortunately, projects conceived solely through government 
agencies without market support are likely to be expensive failures.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
37 http://www.ctrapidtransit.com/  
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   The most pragmatic approach to revitalizing mass transit in Connecticut lies in the 
conversion of CTTransit to a more market oriented structure.  The urban poor will always 
represent a market for the transit agency, but to significantly increase the ridership, the 
company must deliver significant benefits to the more affluent customers in order to lure 
them away from automobiles.  Transit management must lobby to ensure that if public 
funds are to be expended on transit, that CTTransit, or similar private bodies, receive a 
share of funding in proportion to their ridership. 
   Future transportation policy must not favor any one form of transit.  For any given 
mode of transit, policy must allow for the user to be assessed the true total cost of the 
services they receive whether this is in the form of roads or other transit modes.  This will 
eliminate the traditional subsidization of the road systems, which naturally leads to a 
preference of automobiles and buses.  Government wage and route controls have not 
permitted transit systems to operate on a market-based model. Unless transportation is 
returned to a market based system, the historical patchwork of legislation will continue to 
burden transit operators and prevent the entry of private investors from offering mass 
transit services.   
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Bibliography and Research Notes: 
 
   The primary source documents for this brief summer seminar paper come primarily 
from the archives of the Hartford Courant.  This archive provides a complete selection of 
nearly all articles written about this subject in the early 1900s by The Courant.  
Additionally, the Hartford collection contains a scrapbook with a subset of these articles.  
Although the Hartford collection is smaller, it does also contain some articles from the 
now defunct Hartford Times.     
 
   Delos Wilcox’s text containing both analysis and experts from government committee 
hearings were especially useful.  This test was a primary source from many of the raw 
figures that support the arguments presented in this paper.  While Wilcox tends to 
recommend socialization of transit, his views are reflective of movements in the 1920s.  
Wilcox is pragmatic and admits to the difficulties the traction companies have with the 
maintenance regulations and the sometimes outlandish disconnect between operating 
costs and government-fixed wages. 
 
   Hinton and Due is another excellent text dealing with the interurban electric railways.  
This text gives a synopsis of the major interurban electric railway systems.  As Hinton 
and Due note, The Connecticut system is a technically a trolley with many “rural” trolley 
routes, and not an “interurban”, however, Connecticut’s system had enough interurban 
characteristics to be noted in their study.   
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   The Stanford history of the Connecticut Company is the best source detailing the 
complex series of mergers, which resulted in the formation of the Connecticut Company.  
This book is limited, however, in that it is primarily a chronological history with little 
information on the social or regulatory aspects of the trolley system.    
 
   The conclusions presented in this paper are merely a starting point for what will 
hopefully be a larger research project at a future time.  A more thorough investigation of 
Public Utility Commission records would bring additional insights to this field. 
Unfortunately such an investigation requires more time and resources than a compressed 
summer class will allow.  The focus of this research is also limited to the time period in 
which trolleys covered Hartford’s streets, however further research is necessary rela ting 
to the later demise of the Connecticut Company and the formation of CTTransit.  
CTTransit is the present day Connecticut mass transit operator that is a private company 
wholly owned by the Connecticut Department of Transportation.  The author believes 
that the study of the regulation of this field is of great importance because it led the way 
to the regulation of many other areas of private industry, which have shaped the 20th 
century and continue to have ramifications today.    
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